Russia’s Shadow Fleet Could Create Strange Allies

Officially, the shadow fleet doesn’t exist. These rickety, uninsured vessels, running oil from Russia to China, India, and others, live off-book as they cruise the world’s oceans to dodge sanctions.

But they’re all too real, as Russia’s maritime neighbors have painfully discovered. I’ve written about the risk of disastrous oil spills as these shadow vessels pass through Denmark’s treacherous Great Belt. In recent weeks, they have begun conducting a lot of their business just outside the Swedish Baltic Sea island of Gotland. That offers the unorthodox possibility of two unlikely allies joining forces: NATO and environmental groups such as Greenpeace. Neither wants to see oil spilt from crumbling hulks into Europe’s waters.

The shadow vessels travel through the waters of countries that have no oil dealings with Russia but foot the bill each time one of these vessels has an accident in their waters. Last month, the shadow oil tanker Andromeda Star, which is, as is normal for shadow vessels, managed by an obscure firm and was sold to undisclosed buyers at the end of 2023, hit a cargo vessel just off the coast of Denmark.

Ordinarily, the tanker’s insurance would have covered the incident. But because the Andromeda Star is a shadow vessel, it lacked the Western insurance that is the industry standard. Instead, it is insured by a mysterious Russian outfit that’s unlikely to pay out a single krone. Denmark’s taxpayers may never recover the money the authorities spent attending to the incident. Fortunately, the Andromeda Star had its accident while traveling to Russia, its tanks empty—or the consequences could have been far worse.

As I’ve written for Foreign Policy, when Russian shadow vessels sail from Baltic Sea ports out to the Atlantic, they typically pass through the Great Belt. And because many of them refuse pilotage, the risk of accidents is enormous. Yet under international maritime rules, Denmark can’t bar these risky vessels from entering. On April 3, a sanctioned shadow tanker that appears to lack insurance and had been deflagged by Liberia sailed, Lloyd’s List Intelligence reports, from the Russian fuel terminal Ust-Luga on the Baltic Sea through the strait between Denmark and Sweden on to the North Sea and the Mediterranean.

Now Swedish authorities are concerned, too. In recent weeks, Russian shadow vessels have taken to positioning themselves just off the island of Gotland. Or rather, they place themselves just outside the 12-nautical-mile line that marks a country’s territorial waters. But even outside territorial waters, coastal states have an exclusive economic zone where they own the natural resources—and it’s those resources that are now in danger.

The Russian ships are there to conduct ship-to-ship (STS) transfers, the highly hazardous business of transferring oil from one vessel to another. The Swedish public broadcaster SVT has tracked vessels sailing from the Russian port of Primorsk and the Ust-Luga fuel terminal to the waters off eastern Gotland, where they meet up with another tanker, the Zircone.

Swedish officials told me that Gabon, the shadow fleet’s flag state of choice, is suddenly all over Swedish waters. “We have a front-row seat watching the shadow fleet in operation,” a senior Swedish official said. Like Denmark, Sweden faces being subjected to oil spills that will harm its maritime environment and cause considerable work for the authorities and expense to the taxpayer. “For many years, STS has been a huge problem in Denmark, too,” said retired Rear Adm. Nils Wang, a former chief of the Royal Danish Navy. “The risk of oil spills is considerable. But we found out that there was nothing we could do about the STS.”

Oil spills caused by a hostile country illegally operating merchant vessels are not a military attack. But the vessels are indisputably harmful not just to Sweden and Denmark but also to Finland, Estonia, Norway, and other NATO member states whose waters they traverse. Indeed, as I argued in January, Russia could instruct shadow vessels to deliberately cause harm—a cheap and easy way of hurting NATO member states. (It doesn’t help that the Zircone belongs to the Latvian company Fastbunkering, which is itself owned by an Estonian firm.)

Environmental crimes are clearly not NATO’s remit, but local authorities can only investigate once an accident happens. And they won’t be able to deter the activity. When researching this article, I thought of something a Japanese journalist asked me: “Couldn’t Greenpeace do something?”

Of course it could! And before I had finished entertaining this thought, the environmental campaign organization did. On April 12, Greenpeace activists turned up in small boats at the Zircone’s waiting spot off Gotland and painted “Oil Is War” and “People Want Peace” on the tanker’s hull. Suddenly, the whole region knew that Russian shadow vessels had turned the waters off Gotland into a hub for hazardous oil activities.

“This [the shadow fleet] is as wrong as it gets. Not only does the shadow fleet constitute an immediate environmental threat, it is also fuelling Russia’s war on Ukraine,” Rolf Lindahl, Greenpeace Nordic’s peace and energy campaigner, said in a press release. “Our mission at the moment is to bring attention to this problem and put pressure on our governments to stop the shadow vessels,” Lindahl told me by phone. “Ever since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, we’ve been bringing attention to Russia’s transport of fossil fuels. It’s a big problem for our region, especially since so much of Russia’s shadow fleet sails through the Baltic Sea.”

Greenpeace has a long history of activism at sea—directed against nuclear weapons, whaling, and much more—as well as its own small boats. That has put it in the firing line in the past, as when the French security service blew up a Greenpeace boat in New Zealand, killing one person. Ideologically, Greenpeace is often at odds with NATO and its members, but when it comes to the shadow fleet, they are, so to speak, in the same boat. Yes, NATO and Greenpeace would be highly unlikely to officially join forces, but both want the dirty boats gone.

“It would be extremely difficult for NATO to team up with Greenpeace since Greenpeace’s position is that they don’t work with authorities,” Wang noted. “It would have to be an unspoken alliance, with the authorities not intervening whenever Greenpeace decided to spray-paint shadow vessels. As authorities, what we can do is put the binoculars to our blind eye when they target shadow vessels.” Military vessels, for their part, could patrol the waters frequented by shadow vessels. Both actions would cast unwanted attention on those who want to harm the planet in obscurity.

Greenpeace and other activist outfits could also help by identifying and outing the shadowy entities that own the shadow vessels. (Such shaming would convince many a shadowy owner that the shadow fleet isn’t worth the effort.) And analysts at NATO, Greenpeace, and beyond could send the International Maritime Organization (IMO) details about suspected shadow vessels.

Armed with such data, the IMO could create a list of vessels that bear the shadow fleet’s trademarks of poor insurance, obscure ownership, regular signals gaps, and frequently changing flag registration. “Shadow vessel destinations like India may not have a clear picture of which vessels that arrive in their ports are shadow vessels,” Wang said. “And India is surely not interested in having ships in its waters that could endanger the maritime environment.”

New national security threats will, in fact, require NATO to become more agile. It can’t respond to every threat, of course; it’s a military alliance, after all. But with galling violations that cause concrete harm to member states, NATO can intervene—together with novel allies. When it comes to the shadow fleet, doing so would be a good deed for international security and for the environment.