Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. ___ (2024)
The Supreme Court of the United States considered whether an Immigration Judge's (IJ) determination of "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" for the cancellation of removal of a noncitizen was reviewable by an appellate court. The case arose when Situ Kamu Wilkinson, a noncitizen from Trinidad and Tobago, applied for cancellation of removal, arguing that his removal would cause exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his U.S.-born son. The IJ denied Wilkinson's application, and the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The Third Circuit then dismissed Wilkinson's petition for review, holding it lacked jurisdiction to review the IJ's hardship determination.
However, the Supreme Court held that the Third Circuit erred in its decision. It held that the IJ's determination is a mixed question of law and fact, and therefore reviewable under §1252(a)(2)(D), as per the precedent set in Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr. The Court emphasized that the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard is a legal standard applied to facts, not a factual inquiry.
However, the Court also noted that while the question of whether established facts satisfy the statutory eligibility standard is subject to judicial review, the underlying facts in any determination on cancellation of removal remain unreviewable. The Court reversed the Third Circuit's decision, vacated its judgment, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.
A federal appeals court may review a hardship determination by an immigration judge deciding whether a non-citizen is eligible for cancellation of removal and adjustment to lawful permanent resident status.
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
WILKINSON v. GARLAND, ATTORNEY GENERAL
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the third circuit
No. 22–666. Argued November 28, 2023—Decided March 19, 2024
Congress gives immigration judges discretionary power to cancel the removal of a noncitizen and instead permit the noncitizen to remain in the country lawfully. 8 U. S. C. §§1229b(a)–(b). An IJ faced with an application for cancellation of removal proceeds in two steps: The IJ must decide first whether the noncitizen is eligible for cancellation of removal under the statutory criteria. If the IJ finds the noncitizen statutorily eligible, the IJ must then decide whether to exercise discretion and grant relief. For determining eligibility, Congress has enumerated four statutory criteria, one of which requires the noncitizen to “establis[h] that removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to [the noncitizen’s] spouse, parent, or child,” who is a U. S. citizen or lawful permanent resident. §1229b(b)(1)(D).
Petitioner Situ Kamu Wilkinson was arrested and detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement for remaining in the United States beyond the expiration of his tourist visa. Wilkinson applied for cancellation of removal based in part on hardship to his 7-year-old, U. S.-born son, M., who suffers from a serious medical condition and relies on Wilkinson for emotional and financial support. To meet the hardship standard, Wilkinson had to show that M. “would suffer hardship that is substantially different from or beyond that which would ordinarily be expected to result from [his] removal.” In re Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56, 62. Considering all of the hardship factors presented by Wilkinson in the aggregate, the IJ held that M.’s situation did not meet the statutory standard for “exceptional and extremely unusual” hardship and denied Wilkinson’s application. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The Third Circuit held that it lacked the jurisdiction necessary to review the IJ’s discretionary hardship determination. This Court granted certiorari to determine whether the IJ’s “exceptional and extremely unusual” hardship determination is a mixed question of law and fact reviewable under §1252(a)(2)(D) or whether that determination is discretionary and therefore unreviewable under §1252(a)(2)(B)(i).
Held: The Third Circuit erred in holding that it lacked jurisdiction to review the IJ’s determination in this case. Pp. 7–16.
(a) The Third Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction on the basis of §1252(a)(2)(B)(i), which makes unreviewable any “judgment[s] regarding the granting of [discretionary] relief” under §1229b’s cancellation of removal provision. Section 1252(a)(2)(D), however, restores jurisdiction to review “questions of law.” The interaction between these two provisions is governed by two of this Court’s previous cases: Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 589 U.S. 221, and Patel v. Garland, 596 U.S. 328. In Guerrero-Lasprilla, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that whether a noncitizen acted diligently in attempting to reopen removal proceedings for purposes of equitable tolling was a question of fact, not a jurisdiction-restoring “questio[n] of law”. This Court reversed, holding that “questions of law” in §1252(a)(2)(D) included mixed questions of law and fact. 589 U. S., at 225. The Court rejected the Government’s argument that “questions of law” referred only to mixed questions that are primarily legal rather than primarily factual. Then, in Patel, this Court affirmed an Eleventh Circuit holding that it lacked jurisdiction to review an IJ’s factual credibility determinations that fell within §1252(a)(2)(B)(i)’s jurisdictional bar. In so doing, the Court held that §1252(a)(2)(D) did not restore jurisdiction in the case because “questions of fact” are indisputably not “questions of law.” Pp. 7–11.
(b) Wilkinson argues that §1252(a)(2)(D) restores jurisdiction in this case because the threshold question whether a noncitizen is statutorily eligible for cancellation of removal requires a court to assess whether an IJ correctly applied the statutory standard to a given set of facts. Guerrero-Lasprilla compels the conclusion that the application of the statutory “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard to a given set of facts presents a mixed question of law and fact. A mixed question may require “primarily legal or factual work,” and just because it may require a court to immerse itself in facts does not transform the question into one of fact. U. S. Bank N. A. v. Village at Lakeridge, LLC, 583 U.S. 387, 396.
In this case, the application of the hardship standard—which requires an IJ to evaluate a number of factors in determining whether any hardship to a U. S. citizen or permanent-resident family member is substantially different from what would normally be expected in the removal of a close family member—concededly requires a close examination of the facts. As in Guerrero-Lasprilla, a mixed question that requires close engagement with the facts is still a mixed question, and therefore a “questio[n] of law” reviewable under §1252(a)(2)(D). And as in Patel, the IJ’s underlying factual determinations that Wilkinson was credible or that M. had a serious medical condition would be unreviewable factual questions under §1252(a)(2)(D). Pp. 11–12.
(c) The Government’s counterarguments are unpersuasive. First, nothing in Guerrero-Lasprilla or this Court’s other precedents limits that case solely to judicially created standards like the “due diligence” standard for equitable tolling. And this Court has frequently observed that the application of a “statutory standard” presents a mixed question of law and fact. See, e.g., Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 289, n. 19. Second, the case of Williamsport Wire Rope Co. v. United States, 277 U.S. 551, on which the Government relies, has no relevance to the question presented here on §1252(a)(2)(D), and the Government provides no basis for porting the interpretation of “exceptional hardship” in that case to this one. Nor is the Government’s argument from the statutory history of the “hardship requirement” any more persuasive. Finally, the argument that a primarily factual mixed question is a question of fact was previously rejected in Guerrero-Lasprilla, and nothing in §1252(a)(2)(D) supports the Government’s view that the phrase “questions of law” is so limited. Pp. 12–15.
Reversed in part, vacated in part and remanded.
Sotomayor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, JJ., joined. Jackson, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Roberts, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion. Alito, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which Roberts, C. J., and Thomas, J., joined.
Adjudged to be REVERSED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, and case REMANDED. Sotomayor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, JJ., joined. Jackson, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Roberts, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion. Alito, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which Roberts, C. J., and Thomas, J., joined. |
Adjudged to be REVERSED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, and case REMANDED. Sotomayor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, JJ., joined. Jackson, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Roberts, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion. Alito, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which Roberts, C. J., and Thomas, J., joined. |
Argued. For petitioner: Jaime A. Santos, Washington, D. C. For respondent: Colleen R. Sinzdak, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. |
Reply of Situ Kamu Wilkinson submitted. |
Reply of petitioner Situ Kamu Wilkinson filed. (Distributed) |
CIRCULATED |
Electronic record received from the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. |
Brief of Garland, Attorney General of the United States submitted. |
Brief of respondent Garland, Attorney General of the United States filed. (Distributed) |
Record requested from the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. |
SET FOR ARGUMENT on Tuesday, November 28, 2023. |
Motion to dispense with printing the joint appendix filed by petitioner GRANTED. |
Amicus brief of AMERICAN IMMIGRATION LAWYERS ASSOCIATION submitted. |
Amicus brief of Former Executive Office for Immigration Review Judges submitted. |
Amicus brief of Organizations Assisting Survivors of Domestic Violence submitted. |
Brief amici curiae of Organizations Assisting Survivors of Domestic Violence filed. |
Brief amicus curiae of American Immigration Lawyers Association filed. |
Brief amici curiae of Former Executive Office for Immigration Review Judges filed. |
Brief of Situ Kamu Wilkinson submitted. |
Brief of petitioner Situ Kamu Wilkinson filed. |
Motion of Situ Kamu Wilkinson to dispense with joint appendix submitted. |
Motion to dispense with printing the joint appendix filed by petitioner Situ Kamu Wilkinson. |
Motion to extend the time to file the briefs on the merits granted. The time to file the joint appendix and petitioner's brief on the merits is extended to and including August 29, 2023. The time to file respondent's brief on the merits is extended to and including October 18, 2023. |
Motion of Situ Kamu Wilkinson for an extension of time submitted. |
Motion for an extension of time for the filing of the briefs on the merits filed. |
Petition GRANTED. |
As Rule 34.6 provides, “If the Court schedules briefing and oral argument in a case that was governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2(c) or Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 49.1(c), the parties shall submit electronic versions of all prior and subsequent filings with this Court in the case, subject to [applicable] redaction rules.” Subsequent party and amicus filings in the case should now be submitted through the Court’s electronic filing system, with any necessary redactions. |
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 6/29/2023. |
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 6/22/2023. |
Rescheduled. |
Reply of petitioner Situ Kamu Wilkinson filed. (Distributed) |
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 6/15/2023. |
Brief of respondent Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General in response to the petition for certiorari filed. |
Motion to extend the time to file a response is granted and the time is further extended to and including May 12, 2023. |
Motion to extend the time to file a response from May 5, 2023 to May 12, 2023, submitted to The Clerk. |
Motion to extend the time to file a response is granted and the time is further extended to and including May 5, 2023. |
Motion to extend the time to file a response from March 23, 2023 to May 5, 2023, submitted to The Clerk. |
Motion to extend the time to file a response is granted and the time is extended to and including March 23, 2023. |
Motion to extend the time to file a response from February 21, 2023 to March 23, 2023, submitted to The Clerk. |
Petition for a writ of certiorari filed. (Response due February 21, 2023) |
Application (22A516) granted by Justice Alito extending the time to file until January 17, 2023. |
Pursuant to Rule 34.6 and Paragraph 9 of the Guidelines for the Submission of Documents to the Supreme Court's Electronic Filing System, filings in this case should be submitted in paper form only, and should not be submitted through the Court's electronic filing system. |
Application (22A516) to extend the time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari from December 18, 2022 to February 2, 2023, submitted to Justice Alito. |