Russia Just Helped Swing a European Election

The election earlier this month of the Russia-friendly populist Peter Pellegrini to president of Slovakia over the pro-Western candidate, Ivan Korcok, has gifted Moscow another collaborator in the EU, and thus dealt faltering Ukraine a further blow as it struggles on the battlefield. The new president will solidify the power of his close political ally, Prime Minister Robert Fico, who opposes sending military aid to Ukraine, and hand Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban a more solid pro-Russia ally in EU and NATO decision-making processes.

The campaign’s shrill tone, dominated by anti-Ukrainian and pro-Russian disinformation posing Korcok as a U.S. lackey and “candidate of war,” is not just another case of dirty electioneering in Central Europe. It is also the result of Russia’s intervention in Slovakia’s media space and politics, which experts say ramped up significantly during the campaign’s final weeks. It was another stark warning ahead of European parliamentary elections in June that Russian digital propagandists and their proxies are intent upon—and capable of—swaying elections within the EU.

The contest for the Slovakian presidency might at first glance seem like a marginal spectacle. In the Central European country of just 5.4 million, the presidency has few powers, the most consequential being a veto over new legislation—and even that can be overridden by the parliament with a simple majority. Yet for the past five years this post has been held by the progressive-minded environmental and human rights advocate Zuzana Caputova, who, when elected in 2019, many saw as a bright spot in Central and Eastern Europe, a region where populists have thrived. Perhaps her most important work—and evidence of the enormity of the popular figure’s decision not to run for reelection—unfolded in the last six months. Despite her limited reach, Caputova acted as a check on Fico’s three-party coalition, for example by challenging the government’s overhaul of the criminal code.

Korcok, a retired diplomat who was foreign minister from 2020 to 2022, would have been an able successor, observers said. And he entered the race in pole position after winning the first round of voting in March with 42.5 percent of the votes, compared to Pellegrini’s 37 percent.

But a campaign featuring a barrage of pro-Russian disinformation could have been the lever that turned the result around so dramatically: Pellegrini captured around 53 percent, while Korcok trailed woefully with almost 47 percent. Russia’s footprint was all over the election campaign, said Slovak observers, and, as it did in last year’s parliamentary elections, Russia’s machinations may well have swung the vote to its favored candidate.

“Russia’s impact was immense and influential,” said Eva Mihockova of the Bratislava-based think tank Slovak Foreign Policy Association. “The lies and ridiculous falsehoods on dubious websites and social media blasted Korcok as the candidate of war and a dangerous free-market liberal,” she said. “The influence of Russia is obvious, even though there’s no evidence yet that these media are actually paid by Moscow, although there is big suspicion that they are. They certainly take a line that reflects Russia’s interests.” Mihockova said that much of the disinformation comes indirectly through Slovak proxies rather than directly from Russia, in contrast to last year, when Slovakia expelled a Russian diplomat for meddling in the parliamentary campaign.

“Since the pandemic, the pro-Russia, conspiracy-theorizing, so-called alternative media have been and are instrumental in changing the political landscape here, as well as the language and culture,” said Juliana Sokolova, a Slovak poet and philosopher. “They are listened to by lots of people and accepted as true.”

The pro-Russian internet platforms and social media channels, said Slovak experts such as Dominika Hajdu of the Bratislava think tank Globsec, threw their support demonstratively behind Pellegrini after the first round. The websites—such as Hlavne Spravy, ExtraPlus, InfoVojna, and others—reiterated the Kremlin line pretty much verbatim, she said. Hlavne Spravy’s Telegram account is rife with posts about LGBTQ perversion, Washington’s aggressive foreign policies, NATO’s expansionist aims, the NATO-U.S. bombing of Serbia in 1999, and of course the war in Ukraine itself: the oppression of the Russian minority in Ukraine, NATO hawkishness, and the far right in Ukrainian society and politics. Some of the Slovak websites’ news bulletins simply copied, translated, and pasted articles from NewsFront, Hajdu said, referring to a Crimea-based disinformation and propaganda outlet that works with Russia’s main security agency, the FSB.

According to Gerulata Technologies, a Slovak start-up specializing in hybrid threats, the thicket of pro-Russian media is complex and intransparent. There are far-right, far-left, and populist politicians who spread pro-Russian propaganda out of conviction, it said, as well as disinformation media outlets that are sometimes directly connected to Russian interests and others, like the Slovak branch of NewsFront, that are Russian state-controlled trolls and proxies.

The analyst Michaela Ruzickova said in the two weeks before the vote, the pro-Russian narratives reached a crescendo. Even more so than in July last year, Ruzickova, working for the think tank Warsaw Institute, found that “to achieve its goals, the Kremlin uses not only its own resources (embassies, spies, oligarchs), but also local actors who are willing to cooperate and spread Russian propaganda for various incentives.” Ruzickova argued that “the multiplication of Russian influence in Slovakia is facilitated by domestic sympathizers and disinformation actors who willingly adopt the content of pro-Kremlin channels, as well as the official positions of the Russian military and political establishment. Slovak disinformation actors are thus deliberately helping Russia to legitimize its policies and discredit Ukraine, the West, and democratic and international institutions.”

The most pronounced example of this was the way that, in the aftermath of the first-round vote, Slovakia’s pro-Russia media outlets and proxies energetically perpetuated the disinformation that Korcok was the candidate of war who would reinstate military conscription and send Slovak soldiers to Ukraine to fight for Kyiv. They charged that Korcok was a U.S. and NATO puppet who put the interests of the EU and the Atlantic alliance above those of ordinary Slovaks. In fact, Korcok never said this, nor does the Slovak president have the power to send anyone to war. Fico joined in the cacophony of Russian tropes, calling Korcok a “warmonger.”

There is evidence across Central Europe of Russia investing in disinformation channels much like the Slovak websites and illiberal right-wing parties. On March 27, the German magazine Der Spiegel and the Czech Deník N reported that politicians from Germany, France, Poland, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Hungary received payments from Voice of Europe, a portal owned by a pro-Russian Ukrainian oligarch, to spread Russian propaganda in advance of the European Parliament vote. The Czech government slapped sanctions on the platform for promoting Russian interests and covertly financing candidates for the European Parliament, which caused it to cease operations. Voice of Europe had more than 180,000 followers on Twitter/X, according to the BBC.

Matus Kostolny, chief editor of Dennik N, finds it hard to explain the Slovaks’ favorable opinion of Russia after the Soviet Union’s 40 years of postwar occupation of Slovakia and the invasion of Ukraine—in stark contrast to neighboring Czech Republic and Poland. But he underscored that the Russian propaganda in Slovakia has more voices than just “fake journalists” on the internet. “Slovakia’s politicians, particularly in the government parties, regularly mouth this language of Russia and repeat its topics and propaganda. This is more powerful than anything coming directly from Russia.”

“It’s not that Slovaks want to live in Russia, nor do these [pro-Russian] politicians want the Soviet Union back in Slovakia,” Kostolny told Foreign Policy. “But they use it to attack their liberal opponents who have cracked down on the corruption and put their allies behind bars.” The Slovak president, Kostolny noted, has the authority to appoint justices to the Constitutional Court and to issue pardons—two critical levers for reversing the fight against corruption. Kostolny said he wouldn’t be in the least bit surprised if Pellegrini begins pardoning some of the dozens of convicted figures from the ranks of the government parties.

But Slovakia’s new rulers have shown that they will practice what they preach. After the Fico government took office last year, Fico cut off Slovakian military aid to Ukraine and then claimed earlier this year that Ukraine stood “completely under the influence and control of the USA” and is therefore “not an independent and sovereign country.”

Sokolova said that another critical component to the wins by Fico’s party and Pellegrini was the long arm of Orban. The ethnic Hungarians living in Slovakia compose about 8 percent of the population and vote in both Slovak and Hungarian elections. They vote overwhelmingly for Orban’s Fidesz party and tend to chafe under the rule of Slovak nationalist politicos.

But Orban sees an alliance with Slovakia’s populist government, which includes the ultranationalist Slovak National Party, as a better payoff than fighting rhetorical battles over bygone injustices. “Orban mobilizing voters in southern Slovakia via his media for Pellegrini was absolutely decisive,” said Sokolova, an ethnic Hungarian living in southern Slovakia. “The voter turnout [for Pellegrini] was massive in [ethnic] Hungarian towns.”

Mihockova said the ethnic animosity between Slovaks and Hungarians has mostly evaporated in favor of other enmities. “Slovakia’s nationalists and autocrats found that you can win more voters with the hate figure favorites of the Orban regime—such as Brussels, the U.S., and immigrants—than with traditional ethnic nationalism,” she told Foreign Policy. “The Slovak populists see Orban and Fidesz Hungary as a role model.” And, as for Orban’s about-face, “he needs partners,” Mihockova said.

Now, with Slovakia’s populist president and government in place, he has one more partner in his crusade to flip the European Parliament and abandon Europe’s defense of Ukraine.