Washington Should Squeeze Europe Like It’s 1945

In March 1945, the New York Times called Europe a “dark continent” in a condition that “no American can hope to understand.” Destroyed by political extremism and laid waste by a catastrophic war, Europe had become a problem for “every human being in Capetown, in Kansas City, in Brisbane, in Lhasa.”

Quickened by the emergence of the Soviet Union as a global rival, the United States’ reordering of a prostrate, rubble-strewn Western Europe in the late 1940s produced an unprecedented economic, political, and societal success. Leveraging its economic strength to shape structural change, Washington facilitated the rebirth of the Western European economy, which quickly recovered from wartime destruction. With the Marshall Plan and other programs, the U.S. government conditioned its support on cooperation among European countries, which kick-started the process of economic and political integration, as the late Tony Judt described so well in his magisterial Postwar.

With U.S. nudging, Germany’s erstwhile enemies also accepted West German rearmament and integration into NATO, which kept the Soviets in check and Western Europe secure. All of this produced a period of peace and prosperity that was unprecedented in modern European history, and it laid the foundation for the continent’s peaceful unification after the collapse of the Soviet bloc.

Alas, Europe has lived off the diminishing returns of this epic achievement. Despite the European Union’s vast wealth and potential power, it remains reliably incapable of projecting unitary political action. As Ukraine burns, the Middle East festers, and China looms, European countries seem to be returning to their age-old state of division, competition, and distrust. Governments are divided on everything from Russia to Gaza to the U.S. Inflation Reduction Act. The traditional Franco-German engine of European integration and policy is divided; a dearth of strategic leadership is fragmenting Europe from within. The inability of Paris and Berlin to “speak with one voice” on supporting Kyiv’s war effort, for example, has resulted in protracted disagreements on how to handle the continent’s most serious aggression since World War II.

What the ongoing wars in Ukraine and the Middle East—and Europe’s growing panic over the possibility of no longer having the United States at its side—really highlight is that a window of opportunity now exists for Washington, as in 1945, to bend Europe toward a more strategically responsible direction.

The outcome could be a broadly Atlanticist EU that defends itself by combining NATO resources with far greater European military capabilities. It would be an EU that once again views energy and resource security as a core strategic objective and makes economic relations with like-minded allies a central pillar in its own geopolitical ambitions.

Without more pressure from Washington, the EU will very likely remain a diffident, divided, and awkward partner in confronting Russia, China, and other threats, putting both itself and the United States in danger.

Today, three overlapping events provide Washington with the opportunity to reshape Europe. The first is the ongoing war in Ukraine. Without continued U.S. military support, Ukraine not only lacks the capabilities to regain its occupied territories, but could also fail to defend itself from future Russian offensives. And while the EU loves to trumpet its overall financial aid to Ukraine, Washington has so far provided more military aid to Kyiv than all other major donors combined.

The reality is that the EU remains politically unwilling and militarily unable to compensate for current pause in U.S. military aid. In fact, the decades since 1989 have witnessed a dramatic reduction in European military spending, capabilities, and equipment stocks, and most countries have only recently and reluctantly begun the process of rearming. Even with vastly increased expenditures, it will take decades for the EU to meet its defense requirements.

Brussels was barely able to reach agreement in February on a 50 billion euro ($54 billion), multiyear aid package for Ukraine and will likely bicker for years on end over Ukraine’s prospective EU membership. Even the bloc’s modest aim of supplying Ukraine with 1 million rounds of ammunition by this spring quickly turned out to be unachievable. In the medium term, the EU’s approach to defense is what it has always been: Sunday sermons about European ambitions underpinned by a lazy dependence on the United States.

Despite their soaring rhetoric, Brussels and Kyiv understand that without Washington, Russian President Vladimir Putin holds the long-term advantage not only in Ukraine, but also all along the EU’s exposed eastern flank. No matter who wins the U.S. presidential elections in November, the United States should use the threat of withdrawing from NATO—something that former U.S. President Donald Trump considered during his administration—to fundamentally reshape European attitudes to their own security and defense.

Washington should explicitly link the continuation of U.S. military supplies for Ukraine to increased spending by European NATO members, significant EU funding for the recently launched European Defence Industrial Strategy, and expedited Ukrainian membership in the EU. Given Ukraine’s critical shortages of military equipment, one need not wait until all the details are hammered out, but an initial agreement should be finalized immediately.

This kind of pressure campaign on Europe could also help overcome the refusal of U.S. lawmakers to provide further aid to Ukraine. Once again, Congress could learn from U.S. policy in the 1940s and EU policy today.

The EU’s ongoing 50 billion euro funding package for Ukraine actually includes more than 33 billion euros ($35 billion) in low-interest loans, rather than grants. This is a similar concept to the lend-lease plan, the program used by the United States during World War II to supply Britain and other allies. The 1941 Lend-Lease Act allowed Washington to send war supplies to any nation deemed “vital to the defense of the United States.” Congress could adopt a similar approach to future aid to Ukraine. In fact, a Ukraine Democracy Defense Lend-Lease Act was already passed by Congress and signed by President Joe Biden in May 2022, but it expired at the end of September 2023. Its renewal could give Kyiv the military resources—when combined with European financial aid—to regain its territorial sovereignty.

Such an approach applies both a carrot and a stick to reshape the European Union’s security posture and support Ukraine’s survival. While aid to Ukraine critically serves U.S. national security, it is also a pressure point to shape the EU—which would be most affected if Ukraine were overrun—into a stronger, more useful ally.

The second window of opportunity for the United States to pressure Europe is energy policy. The EU’s ongoing decoupling from Russian natural gas supplies has resulted in a broader debate about how to balance the EU’s strict energy transition objectives—which are costing the bloc and its member states several trillion euros—with security of supply. In a welcome onset of energy realism, the EU recently labeled gas and nuclear energy as “climate friendly” transition fuels in moving toward a zero emission economy.

The United States already supplied nearly half of the EU’s imports of liquefied natural gas in 2022, making it the bloc’s energy supplier of last resort. Washington should condition this openly on Brussels remaining committed to achieving real energy security. Europe’s dependency on Russian gas is one reason that Putin thought he had a free hand to invade Ukraine in 2014 and again in 2022. Washington should press Europe—especially Germany—not to make that mistake again.

Finally, the Kremlin’s war and suspension of gas deliveries to Europe have conspired to unleash political and economic instability in Germany, the EU’s largest and most important economy. Against the background of political chaos—including the monthslong inability to pass a federal budget—an anxious and inward-looking German government is pursuing inconsistent and painstakingly cautious policies on Ukraine aid and other issues, all of which has served to alienate many EU member states. Europe cannot rely on Germany to lead the necessary reorientation of the EU into a bloc capable of developing meaningful military capabilities.

Therein lies the third opportunity and leverage point for the United States. Washington should step into the leadership void—not to lead Europe, but to help hammer out the next phase of the trans-Atlantic security relationship. Many EU member states—including most Nordic, Baltic, Central, and Eastern European states—would welcome direct pressure from Washington to condition trans-Atlantic security relations on clear European policy changes, most notably on a much more serious expansion of defense capabilities and meaningful energy independence from Russia.

That’s why Washington should squeeze Europe like it’s 1945—and why it would benefit both sides.